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NON-ORGANIC THEORIES OF VALUE
AND POINTLESS EVIL
John O'Leary-Hawthorne

In this paper, I shall argue that if a certain theory of value is correct, then
there is pointless evil in the world. I shall not try to defend the theory. Nor
shall I assume that a justified belief in pointless evil is sufficient epistemic
warrant for atheism. Thus I am not arguing for atheism here. This paper is
intended rather to help elucidate what it would take to demonstrate that no
one is justified in believing in pointless evil. If my thesis is correct, then any
successful attempt to show that no belief in pointless evil is justified will,
inter alia, have to demonstrate that belief in what I shall call "a non-organic
theory of value" is irrational.

1. Preliminary Considerations
According to a non-organic theory of value, the quantity of non-derivative
value that obtains at one temporal stage of the universe depends solely upon
the intrinsic facts that obtain at that temporal stage. I (Something is of nonderivative value just in case it is valuable in itself. By contrast, something
has instrumental value just in case it brings about something of non-derivative
value.) Hence on this view the non-derivative value attaching to some stage
is not, even in part, determined by its place in the temporal order of things.
Such a theory will be subscribed to by anyone who thinks that the fundamental bearers of value are momentary mental states. Thus it is held, notably, by
the utilitarian who holds that the value that obtains during some period of the
universe's history depends solely upon the balance of pleasure over pain that
obtains at that period. 2 The proponent of such a theory need not, of course,
claim that we speak falsely when we ascribe value to items whose temporal
structure seems important-a piece of music, for example. Rather she would
insist that the value of such things is merely instrumental. We may formulate
the non-organic thesis as follows:
1. The balance of non-derivative value over disvalue of any temporal stage
in the universe's history supervenes on the intrinsic details of that temporal stage.

That is, if some stage of the actual world is intrinsically the same as some
stage of another possible world, then according to the non-organic theory,
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those two stages must have equivalent amounts of non-derivative value attaching to them.
The existence of pointless evil can be inferred from the non-organic theory,
coupled with the following principle: there is no metaphysically necessary
connection between the intrinsic structure of events at one temporal stage of
the world and the intrinsic structure of events at another, non-overlapping
temporal stage. This principle does not merely deny that the intrinsic detail
at one temporal stage is a sufficient condition for every intrinsic detail at
every other non-overlapping stage. Rather, it claims that the intrinsic detail
at any given temporal stage is not a sufficient condition for any intrinsic detail
at any other non-overlapping stage.
Why might one hold this stronger thesis? Here is one good reason. Take
the intrinsic state of a possible world Wl at some time t. It seems that there
is another world W2 which, at the first moment of its existence, is exactly
like WI at t. It also seems that there is a third world W3 which, at the last
moment of its existence, is exactly like Wl at t. I cannot prove that these
worlds are possible. But I offer it as a reasonable metaphysical conjecture
that they are possible. Those worlds would doubtless have different laws of
nature. But that requirement only makes problems for my conjecture if the
laws of nature that operate at this world are reasonably thought to be metaphysically necessary. But I know of no good reason to think that they are.
One virtue of my metaphysical conjecture is that something like it looms
large in Christian thinking, and so the atheist who employs it cannot be
accused of question-begging. For it is commonly thought that God has the
power to create ex nihilo a world which at the moment of creation was just
like the state of the actual world at some particular moment in time. Moreover, the doctrine that God can perform miracles requires the God not be
constrained by causal laws, which in turn requires that those laws be contingent.
If possible worlds of the sort that I have entertained really are possible,
then it would indeed seem to follow that the intrinsic detail at one temporal
stage is not a sl}fficient condition for any intrinsic fact at any other non-overlapping stage. Take some such intrinsic fact F. If F obtains at a temporal stage
T2 which is later than another stage Tl, then the intrinsic detail at Tl is not
sufficient for Fat T2 since it is possible that T1 be the last stage in the world's
history, in which case F would not have obtained. If F obtains at Tl, the detail
at 1'2 is not sufficient for F since it is possible for T2 to be the first stage in
the world's history. So, neither the intrinsic detail of earlier nor later stages
is sufficient for F. Since the considerations presented here do not depend on
any peculiarities had by F, they generalize to any intrinsic fact at any stage.
There is one objection that is worth discussing, brought to my attention by
William Alston. The principle, as I have stated it, ranges not just over the
world created by God, but over God Himself. (So long as God is in time, that
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is.) Now the theist may well be willing to concede that the temporal stages
of the cosmos are metaphysically independent. But she will be unlikely to
concede that the temporal stages of God are so independent. For one thing, that
would have the consequence that God can commit suicide, a controversial doctrine indeed. To take care of this, we can formulate the principle as follows:
2. The intrinsic structure of non-overlapping temporal stages of the cosmos
is not linked by metaphysical necessity, where 'cosmos' is intended to
include the whole domain of contingent beings.

The 'intrinsic' qualification is of course crucial here. Take the stage at which
I was born. Take the stage at which my mother was born. If Kripke's necessity
of origins thesis is correct, then the birth of John Hawthorne is linked by
metaphysical necessity to the birth of Mary Hawthorne. That doesn't violate
the principle above, however. All it entails is that there are possible worlds
which have spatio-temporal zones which are intrinsically exactly like the one
occupied by my birth at this world, but where I am not born. In what follows
I shall indicate how one can reasonably infer the existence of pointless evil
on the basis of (1) and (2) above.

2. The Argument
An event E is an instance of pointless evil just in case (a) it has non-derivative disvalue, (b) there is no event or class of events which E is necessary
for and whose non-derivative value equals or outweighs E and (c) there is no
event or class of events whose non-derivative disvalue is greater than E and
which E is necessary to prevent. 3
Why the restriction to non-derivative value/disvalue? Well, suppose an evil
was metaphysically necessary for some event of great instrumental value.
One couldn't infer that the evil wasn't pointless unless that instrumental value
was in turn necessary for some event of non-derivative value (whose value
was greater than the disvalue of the evil.) The following example should
illustrate this. Suppose I kill Joe and thereby save ten lives. The death of Joe
might reasonably be taken to be of great instrumental value. Suppose further
that I could have saved those ten lives without harming anybody. In that case,
we would be in no position to infer that the death of Joe wasn't pointless on
the basis of its instrumental value.
We can now proceed with the argument. Take some occurrence which your
favorite non-organic theory holds to be of non-derivative disvalue. Let us
suppose it is a pain which occurs at t in the actual world. Take the temporal
stage of the actual world which includes all future times after t. If (2) is
correct, there is no metaphysically necessary connection between the intrinsic
structure of the latter stage and the pain. So there is a possible world where
the pain doesn't occur, but where the intrinsic facts that obtain after t at the
actual world still obtain. So by (1), if some non-organic theory is true, there
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is a possible world where the same quantity of goodness obtains after t but
where the pain doesn't occur. Similar considerations show that if some nonorganic theory is true, there is a possible world where the same quantity of
goodness obtains before t but where the pain doesn't occur. Consider next
any past or future evils which would have obtained if the pain hadn't obtained. The presence of pain can't be absolutely necessary for the prevention
of such evils, for that would violate (2).
Therefore, if (1) and (2) are correct, it seems that the only ways to defend
the claim that the pain is not an instance of pointless evil is to assert either
(a) that there are goods that obtain at the time of the pain that the pain was
necessary for of else (b) that there are evils that would have obtained at the
time of the pain that the pain was necessary to prevent.
We can quickly dismiss (b). There is a world whose whole history is the
same as the history of the actual world after t. So there is no evil which does
not obtain at our world which the pain at t is necessary to prevent. How about
(a)? This move has very little prima facie plausibility. Even those who hold
that the pains of, say, Holocaust victims had a point would hardly be inclined
to suggest that their point is to be found at the time that the suffering was
endured. 4
Perhaps the theist will grant that there are no goods that obtain in the world
of spatia-temporal beings that the pain is necessary for. However, he might
argue that there are goods that obtain in the life of God for which the pain is
necessary. Again, though, this line looks very implausible. Most theists would
not take seriously the possibility that the pains of Holocaust victims are
justified by, say, the pleasure they give directly to God. They would concede
that such pains, if they are justified at all, are justified at least in part by
virtue of benefits that accrue to the victims themselves or to other creatures
of God.
Thus there is good reason to think that given a non-organic theory of value,
there is pointless evil in the world. We can use this result to show that a
common objection against justified belief in pointless evil is wanting. It runs
like this. To judge whether an evil is pointless, one needs epistemic access
to its consequences. Human beings lack the power to compute the state of
the world at times far into the future. Hence we are not in a position to believe
reasonably that there is pointless evil. I have shown that it is by no means
clear that in order to believe justifiably that there is pointless evil, one needs
to have epistemic access to distant spatio-temporal zones. All one needs is a
justified belief in the metaphysical independence of non-overlapping temporal stages of the world together with a justified belief that some non-organic
theory of value is true. (Well, to be accurate, one also needs the justified
belief that there is at least one instance of evil.) None of this requires clairvoyant powers.
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To conclude, then, an adequate attack on the epistemic status of belief in
pointless evil will have to give good reason to doubt the rationality of belief
in (1) or (2) above. Since those attacks that I know of have not undertaken
this task, they are inadequate. 5.6

Syracuse University
NOTES
1. I shall be assuming a 4-d view of concrete objects. It should be clear, however, that
my remarks do not depend on this.
2. I am assuming of course that the quantity of pleasure and pain that obtains at a time
is determined by the intrinsic state of the universe at that time. This seems to be obviously
true.

3. A few refinements may be appropriate here. However, to incorporate them and then
to address them in what follows would make the text unnecessarily cluttered. I leave it as
an exercise for the reader to add his favorite refinements and discover how it leaves the
central thrust of the argument untouched.
4. A theist can reasonably argue that there is some point to evil that is found at the time
suffering is endured. Marilyn Adams suggests that when we suffer we obtain some
"identification with and vision into the inner life of the creator." ("Redemptive Suffering:
A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil," in Rntionality, Religious Belief and Moral
Commitment, eds. Audi and Wainwright, [Cornell University Press, 1986], p. 267). But it
is hard to take seriously the claim that a sufficient reason for the permission of all actual
evils can be found along these lines.
5. See for example, Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments
from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'." International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion (1984); Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God. (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1982).
6. I would like to thank William Alston, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Frances HowardSnyder for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

